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Plain stationery
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9 July 1956

Dear Leon:

So much has been happening in the matter which you discussed before you left and so many statements have been issued, that it is hard to keep up to date and it seemed quite futile to catch you on your trip with all of the documentation we are getting together on the subject.

If you get back here before I leave early in August, we could have a talk about the situation, and if not, possibly we will meet somewhere in Europe.

The date of my departure is still somewhat indefinite, but I expect it will be around the middle of August.

Sincerely,

SIGNED
/s/ AWD

Leon Moore, Esq.

Hotel La Pace
Montecatini, Terme (Pistoia)
Italy.

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22 June 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Mr. Leon Moore

1. On 19 June Mr. Leon Moore called me by telephone from New York City concerning a newspaper article by Marguerite Higgins, called "More Soviet Secrets", which appeared in the New York Herald Tribune of the previous day. The article in question is attached.

2. Mr. Moore pointed out that according to Marguerite Higgins the United States had in its possession five important documents containing information bearing on the Soviet leadership. Mr. Moore said that he was calling me in the absence of the Director to say that he hoped soon to write an analytical letter to the Director on the whole question of Soviet leadership. He said that if these documents actually were in the possession of the United States Government he would like to see them before he wrote this letter.

3. I undertook to convey this request to the Director on Mr. Moore's behalf and to try to get him an answer of some sort dispatched to one of the two following addresses:

Hotel Principe di Monde, Turin, Italy
(30 June to 4 July)

or

Hotel La Pace, Monte Catini (Pistoia) Terme, Italy
(4 July to 18 July)

4. I fortunately was in a position when I talked with Mr. Moore of being able to say that I had not read Miss Higgins' article and therefore that I could not tell him whether or not she was referring to documents actually in the possession of the agency or whether Mr. Bialer, on whose Congressional testimony her article mainly relies, might have been exaggerating the extent of his knowledge.

5. I called the Higgins article to the attention of both Mr. Wisner and Mr. Maury, pointing out that the article and its treatment of Bialer's remarks suggested--at least to Mr. Moore--that we had such documents and were revealing their contents publicly.

6. I am sure Mr. Moore expects a personal message from the Director or, failing that, a letter from me.

Ray S. Cline
RAY S. CLINE

Attachment

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NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

JUN 18 1956

More Soviet "Secrets"

By Marguerite Higgins

FOR the first time, the United States has obtained apparently authentic accounts of the real story behind the great post-Stalin shifts of power within the Kremlin.

From documents in the possession of the Western powers, it turns out that the outside world until now has had only fragmentary and often distorted accounts of the liquidation of Lavrenti Beria, Soviet chief of internal security, the demotion of Georgi Malenkov, former Premier, and the ouster of Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. The documents portray the Communist party boss Nikita Khrushchev, the former plumber from the Ukraine, as an expert in-fighter in the struggle for power that has made him "first among equals" in the current Soviet hierarchy.

Additionally, the Kremlin curtain has been widely parted by testimony (both public and private) before the Senate Internal Security Committee given by Seweryn Bialer, an important Polish Communist official who recently defected to America.

This has been supplemented and corroborated by independent Western access to at least five documents (three of them mentioned by Bialer): a summary of some private conversations between Russia's top leaders and Marshal Tito; two secret letters of the Soviet Party presidium (Politburo) explaining respectively Beria's purge and Malenkov's downfall; Khrushchev's Warsaw speech denouncing Malenkov; and a stenographic account of the July, 1955, Communist party meeting in which Molotov's fate was sealed.

* * *

Such a deep look into the inner workings of the Kremlin is unprecedented. Ironically it has been made possible primarily by Khrushchev himself. For in the process of denouncing Stalin's one-man rule, Khrushchev has initiated the policy of dispatching "secret" letters of information to key comrades as a measure of "democratizing" the party to the extent of letting at least the elite few know what's going on. Mr. Khrushchev may well be regretting this "democratization" and the unpreventable new leaks to the West. For as compiled by the Communists themselves, the record casts the current Communist party boss in a tricky light.

An outstanding example is the Politburo letter — signed by Khrushchev—on the Beria case. In light of recent events, it comes as a shock to read that one of the reasons Beria was suspected of espionage was that he sought to renew ties between Moscow and Belgrade. One of the points against Beria was that he suggested establishing a special telephone line between the two capitals so that there could be direct contact with Marshal Tito.

* * *

The supreme irony is that Khrushchev only a year after joining in such accusations against Beria should not only take the lead in seeking the rapprochement with Yugoslavia but denounce Beria as responsible for past hostility between Moscow and Belgrade.

Among the hitherto unpublished charges against Beria outlined in the Politburo explanation of his liquidation are:

1. That he was spying on his colleagues in the Politburo to the extent of putting them under surveillance and tapping their wires. The letter cites one occasion [illegible]

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letter, Beria replied "if you don't carry out my orders I will crush you into labor camp dust."

2. That Beria was a moral degenerate, staging erotic orgies in a special Moscow apartment. He was accused of selecting women from Moscow prisons and then dispatching them to labor camps after dispensing with their services.

Beria was shot December, 1953, at the time when Georgi Malenkov was still prime minister. So far as the outside world could tell, the entire Politburo was united against Beria.

* * *

There certainly was no outward hint of a link between Beria and Malenkov. But when the time came for Malenkov's demotion, another Politburo letter asserted that the fallen Soviet premier was responsible with Beria for the 1946 Leningrad trials. According to the current Communist line, these trials were fabricated as part of the Stalinist terror and involved the unjust liquidation of thousands of good Communists.

In commenting on the impact of the Politburo's Beria-and-Malenkov letter, Mr. Bialer told the Senate committee: "I came to the conclusion that Khrushchev, aiming at seizure of power in the party, had adopted the tactics of removing his rivals one by one. As long as it was necessary he, together with Malenkov, accused Beria of staging the Leningrad trials. Eighteen months later when Malenkov's turn came, Khrushchev made him co-responsible. Yet Malenkov had been at Khrushchev's side when Beria was purged. Why wasn't Malenkov accused of it in those days? The answer was that Malenkov was indispensable in the fight against Beria and his turn had not yet come."

Khrushchev personally carried the fight againt another Malenkov "mistake"—overemphasis on consumer goods—directly to the East European satellites, for he feared the effect of Malenkov's "soft" example. In another not-so-secret speech made in the spring of 1955 in Warsaw, Khrushchev engaged in a revealing burst of prose, saying to top Polish Communists: "It is true that you do not have good ladies' hats; it is true that there is probably not enough food in Poland. But you must remember that we must have first of all heavy industry. The more steel we produce for the Soviet bloc the more sleepless nights Mr. Dulles will have in Washington."

Malenkov, the first prominent Russian to be demoted rather than purged, is now minister of electric power stations.

The showdown with Molotov came at the July, 1955, meeting of the Communist party. According to Mr. Bialer, who held many Communist party posts including that of propaganda chief for the Polish Politburo, the showdown had been brewing for many months. "Molotov's 'mistakes' were tolerated by Khrushchev for obvious reasons," Mr. Bialer testified. "Molotov's help was necessary to force Malenkov's resignation. In February, 1955, Molotov was still indispensable to Khrushchev, as Malenkov had been indispensable during the purge of Beria in July, 1953."

Yugoslavia was the touchstone of the Khrushchev-Molotov controversy. According to the stenographic reports of the July meeting, Molotov favored a rapprochement with Tito on a governmental level but insisted that Communist party problems should not be discussed with him because the Yugoslav Marshal was "anti-Soviet and his views far removed from communism."

At this point in the lively and often abusive interchange Khrushchev interrupted Molotov to say "but in 1939 you could talk to Ribbentrop" (Hitler's foreign minister with whom Molotov negotiated the Hitler-Stalin pact).

* * *

Later Khrushchev, even while protesting that he had "nothing personal against Molotov," exclaimed: "Vyacheslav Mikhailovitch! All of this is your wife's fault. It would be much better for you if you didn't listen to her. She pushes you and makes you ambitious. She is your evil spirit."

Molotov "resigned" as foreign minister the day before Tito arrived in Moscow.

Perhaps most intriguing to the West in the search for the real meaning of Khrushchev's actions is his discussion of coexistence in Warsaw. At a time when the Communist party leader felt he was speaking to trusted comrades, he said: "We are discussing co-existence." Khrushchev observed: "But of course we must realize that we cannot co-exist eternally. One of us must go to his grave. We do not want to go to the grave. They (the Western powers) don't want to go to their graves either. So what must be done? We must push them to their graves."

"Do you know that Walter

Taxes on Home Owners

To the N. Y. Herald Tribune:

Mayor Wagner has certified the city budget for the fiscal year starting July 1 so now it is official.

As a result of this nearly $2 billion budget, real estate taxes will be increased again. I know of a homeowner who has had the assessment on his home raised about 40 per cent in the last ten years and his real estate taxes over 100 per cent. If the city is trying to discourage homeownership a sure way to do it is to make it a burden to own a home here.

HOWARD W. TONER.
Brooklyn, June 11, 1956.

Health and Public Life

To the N. Y. Herald Tribune:

Lest the voters forget—former President Truman underwent surgery; Adlai Stevenson was hospitalized; Mr. Harriman was operated upon, all recently. This indicates that President Eisenhower's health need not become an issue in the coming election, and his outstanding record as our Chief Executive should